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Universities:
The Fallen Angels of Bayh-Dole?
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert Cook-Deegan
Abstract: The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 established a new default rule that allowed nonprofit organizations
and small businesses to own, as a routine matter, patents on inventions resulting from research sponsored by
the federal government. Although universities helped get the Bayh-Dole Act through Congress, the primary
goal, as reflected in the recitals at the beginning of the new statute, was not to benefit universities but to promote the commercial development and utilization of federally funded inventions. In the years since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities seem to have lost sight of this distinction. Their behavior as patent
seekers, patent enforcers, and patent policy stakeholders often seems to work against the commercialization
goals of the Bayh-Dole Act and is difficult to explain or justify on any basis other than the pursuit of revenue.
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he Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 established a new default rule that allowed nonprofit organizations and
small businesses to own, as a routine matter, patents
on inventions resulting from research sponsored by
the federal government.1 The new law replaced divergent and changeable rules and practices of different federal funding agencies. It made ownership
more predictable and reduced the need for case-bycase negotiations to secure rights.2
University patent ownership featured prominently in subsequent commentary on the Bayh-Dole Act,
but the initial choice to limit the new rule to nonprofit organizations and small businesses was a matter
of political expediency. Although universities helped
get the Bayh-Dole Act through Congress, the primary goal, as reflected in the recitals at the beginning of
the statute, was not to benefit universities but to promote the commercial development and utilization of
federally funded inventions.3 It was part of a broader initiative to give patent ownership to research contractors, rather than to federal funding agencies, in
order to accelerate commercial development. By ap© 2018 by Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert Cook-Deegan
doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00521
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plying the new default ownership rule only
to nonprofit organizations (including universities) and small businesses, advocates
sidestepped decades-old objections to giving patent monopolies to powerful business interests when inventions were made
at taxpayer expense. Had large businesses
been included in Bayh-Dole, an anonymous
Senate aide confided to a reporter, “the bill
would never have [had] a chance of passing.”4 But the limitation was only temporary. Soon enough, the new policy was extended to large businesses, first quietly in an
executive order signed by President Ronald
Reagan, and then more durably in an inconspicuous amendment to the statute.5
Universities fit awkwardly in the arguments for patent ownership by contractors rather than government agencies.
Advocates emphasized that government
agencies do not commercialize inventions
themselves, and therefore government
ownership inevitably required costly licensing transactions to transfer the rights
that firms required to protect investments
in commercialization. Government stewards might be cautious about giving public
property away to private firms, introducing uncertainty and delay. When the contractor was a private firm, commercialization could proceed more quickly by vesting rights in the contractor from the outset.
But universities are quite different from private firms. Like the government, universities do not themselves commercialize inventions, but must license their patents
for commercialization to proceed. Moreover, in 1980, most universities were relative newcomers to the patent system, having generally avoided patenting for much of
the twentieth century, concerned that patenting conflicted with their mission to disseminate knowledge.6 Universities had no
more, and arguably less, expertise in licensing than the government agencies that were
criticized as ineffective, and had a similar
history of hostility toward patents.
147 (4) Fall 2018

Universities had, however, another argument for patent ownership: only they
could provide the close collaboration between faculty and commercial licensees
necessary to achieve effective technology
transfer for early-stage inventions made in
academic laboratories. Patent ownership
would give universities and their faculties
incentives to secure patent rights and to
aid commercial licensees in developing
their inventions and bringing them to market. Otherwise, universities would have
little reason to divert time and resources away from their academic missions in
order to secure patents and to collaborate
with licensees. Universities’ history of forsaking patents in favor of publication and
the dissemination of knowledge made this
account plausible. It also made universities seem more trustworthy than business
firms: universities would use their patents
for public benefit rather than private gain.
The perceived halos over universities lit
the path to passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
As a justification for university patents,
the logic of technology transfer has limits.
Some university inventions surely fit the
paradigm of early-stage discoveries requiring further substantial private investment,
assisted by university scientists, to launch
as commercial products. An important example highlighted in the Bayh-Dole hearings was candidate drugs funded by the
National Institutes of Health (nih) medicinal chemistry program. Private firms had
proven unwilling to develop these drugs
and to shepherd them through the fda
approval process under the terms of nih
agreements from the 1960s that restricted the firms’ ability to secure exclusive
rights.7 Exclusive patent rights were necessary to motivate pharmaceutical firms to
invest in expensive clinical trials of promising new drugs. The nih responded by developing Institutional Patent Agreements
(ipas) that enabled universities to patent
drugs resulting from federally funded re-
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search and to license their rights to firms.
But some ipas were stalled in administrative review while Bayh-Dole was pending,
fueling university interest in codifying patent ownership rules.
Many university inventions, however, do
not require substantial postdiscovery investment and the assistance of faculty inventors to achieve commercial application.
Some of the most lucrative university patents covered broad enabling technologies
that would have been ready for widespread
use with or without university patents.
These included the Cohen-Boyer patents on
basic recombinant dna techniques (which
have generated approximately $255 million
for Stanford University and the University of California) and the Axel patents on
methods to introduce genes for foreign proteins in eukaryotes (which have generated
approximately $800 million for Columbia
University).8 Such technologies face little
risk of languishing in academic archives if
they are published without patents. Patenting them may provide revenue for universities, but it does not further Bayh-Dole’s explicit goal of promoting the development
and dissemination of new technologies. According to Niels Reimers, who developed
the licensing scheme for the Cohen-Boyer
patents, patents on such platform technologies impose a “tax” on subsequent applications, redounding to the benefit of universities, which then use the funds for education and research.9 Universities prize such
patents as a source of unfettered discretionary funds, but they do not promote commercialization; rather, they make commercial development more costly by imposing a
need to negotiate and pay for licenses.
Congress recognized that contractor
ownership might not be the best way to
achieve its goals in all cases. Bayh-Dole provided several mechanisms to depart from
this default rule in the terms of funding
agreements. In “exceptional circumstances,” the agency could determine that with-

holding title to the invention would better
promote the goals of the Act.10 An agency could also exercise statutory “marchin rights” to license Bayh-Dole patents if
it determined that the university or its exclusive licensee was not taking steps to
achieve “practical application of the subject invention” or, if necessary, “to alleviate
public health or safety needs.”11 Finally, the
government retained a paid-up, nonexclusive license to use or to authorize others to
use the inventions on behalf of the government.12 But federal research sponsors have
made little use of these provisions to date,
perhaps because of burdensome procedural requirements.13 These requirements
were no accident. The architects of BayhDole sought to overcome hostility toward
patents in universities and in some funding agencies that they saw as an obstacle to
commercial development.
The statute did not limit the new ownership rule to inventions requiring follow-on
investment to promote development. And
universities have not imposed such limits
on themselves.14 Universities soon came to
regard their Bayh-Dole patents as entitlements, using them to generate revenue even
when licensing rights were unnecessary for
commercialization. The result may actually impede commercialization in some cases, and certainly makes it more expensive.
The drafters of the Bayh-Dole Act may
have failed to realize that antipatent attitudes were quickly declining in the academy. Bayh-Dole accelerated a trend that
was well under way in the 1970s to reverse
formal policies against patenting and to
establish university technology transfer
offices.15 As economist Bhaven Sampat
observes, Bayh-Dole fostered university
patenting “by providing strong Congressional endorsement for the position that
active university involvement in patenting and licensing, far from being ignoble,
serves the public interest.”16 Perhaps universities could keep their halos while plow-
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In the post–Bayh-Dole era, universities
ing patent revenues back into research and
education.
–the third-largest employer of lobbyists–
One could argue for university patent have had some success in getting Congress
ownership as a way to give universities fi- to shape patent law to favor their internancial rewards for valuable inventions. ests.19 They have secured statutory changNotably, this is not among the seven goals es that fortify university patents and make
recited in the Bayh-Dole preamble.17 Such it harder for firms to avoid liability for inan explicit recital might well have drawn fringing them.
political fire. But the argument was not
Meanwhile, universities have had imporeven made.
tant losses in the courts, especially before
Sometimes legislation enacted for one the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
purpose turns out to serve another, equal- Circuit (Federal Circuit), an intermedily important purpose. Whatever the intent ate appellate court with consolidated jurisin 1980, enhancing university revenues diction over patent matters. In a growing
through patents may now seem like sound body of case law, the courts have refused to
policy. But even now, the revenue-for-uni- adapt patent doctrine to accommodate the
versities rationale is raised only sotto voce, if circumstances of university research, someat all. In case after case, universities justify times with open skepticism toward argutheir patent rights by appealing to the dan- ments that universities are acting in the pubger of inventions languishing for lack of pat- lic interest. At times, special pleading from
ent protection, even when university pat- universities seems to have backfired, proents are plainly unnecessary for commer- voking courts to fortify doctrines that limcialization. The argument persists because it the patenting of the kinds of early-stage
promoting commercialization, not revenue, discoveries that universities often produce.
was the foremost justification for university patent ownership in the Bayh-Dole Act.
niversities have, in many cases, pursued
The overall impact of Bayh-Dole has been patents that they could enforce against
a topic of lively debate in the thirty-eight product-developing firms for the evident
years since its passage.18 University patent- purpose of getting a piece of the action in
ing has dramatically increased, and a few lucrative technologies that were already
universities have made a lot of money from being actively developed without the need
royalties. Yet licensing revenues remain a for university patents. They have somesmall portion of university budgets overall. times worn their academic halos to court,
Respondents to a 2015 survey of the Associ- seeking to adapt patent doctrine to priviation of University Technology Managers lege the interests of universities over the
reported $2.5 billion in licensing revenues competing interests of product-developing
(including revenues from trademark, copy- firms. This agenda has met with considerright, and unpatented technologies). This able skepticism from the Federal Circuit,
is less than 4 percent of the $66.6 billion in which has sometimes explicitly questioned
university research expenditures, with the whether university patents are promoting
wealthiest universities capturing most of or impeding commercial product develthe benefits. Although university technol- opment.
ogy transfer professionals take credit for
An early sign that universities were pursustimulating commercial development of ing patents that were unnecessary for comnew technologies, it is not clear how much mercial development was the involvement
of that development would have occurred of universities in interference proceedwithout university patents.
ings–administrative proceedings within
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the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to determine priority of invention–in which the
university claimed to have made the invention before a commercial inventor. When a
university competes with a near-simultaneous commercial inventor seeking patent
rights on the same invention, it is difficult
to argue that the university is just trying to
preserve incentives for commercialization
of an invention that would otherwise fail to
attract commercial interest. Interferences
are only available to establish priority for
patent applications filed before March 16,
2013, when U.S. law changed to award priority to the first inventor to file a patent application rather than to the first to make the
invention.20 But before that date, interferences were especially common in biotechnology, a field in which multiple research
teams often compete intensely to reach the
same goals (such as cloning an obviously
important gene). Health policy scholars
Jonathan Merz and Michelle Henry found
that interferences in biotechnology and organic chemistry were six times more frequent than for patents on average, and that
most of the highly competitive “races” the
authors cited involved academic research
institutions.21
Having to litigate a costly interference
against a university can only increase the
costs and risks facing a product-developing firm. Yet universities persisted in these
costly battles, appealing to the Federal Circuit when they lost in the Patent Office. In
a priority dispute between academic patent
applicants and a pharmaceutical firm over
an assay to identify anticancer compounds,
for example, the University of Texas Southwestern Medical School pursued repeated
appeals to the Federal Circuit, although presumably the firm’s commercialization incentives would have been adequately protected by its own already-issued patent on
the same invention.22
Another strategy for universities more
interested in revenues than in promoting

product development is to seek broad patent rights on the basis of preliminary academic research that would allow them to
sue private firms that later develop products not disclosed in the university patent applications. The Federal Circuit has
been consistently hostile to these efforts,
invalidating university patents in a series
of decisions that fortified the patent law requirement that a patent application must
include a “written description” of the invention.23
Regents of the University of California v. Eli
Lilly involved the first commercial recombinant dna product that ever reached the
market: human insulin.24 University of
California (uc) researchers, having cloned
the rat insulin gene, obtained a broad patent covering recombinant microorganisms
with dna sequences encoding human insulin, mammalian insulin, and vertebrate insulin, although the only sequence they disclosed was for rat insulin.25 Meanwhile, scientists at Genentech successfully cloned the
human insulin gene and produced recombinant human insulin. The pharmaceutical
firm Eli Lilly manufactured and distributed the final product, which began to replace
the previously used insulin product purified from slaughtered pigs as a treatment
for diabetes. The University of California
sued Eli Lilly and Genentech for patent infringement. On appeal, the Federal Circuit
held the uc patent invalid on the basis of
what was then a controversial application
of the written description requirement. The
Federal Circuit held that the written description in the uc patent disclosure only
showed possession of the gene for rat insulin, and because the human insulin gene had
a slightly different dna sequence (because
the human insulin protein has a somewhat
different amino acid sequence), the patent
disclosure was insufficient to support the
claims to genes for human insulin and for
all vertebrate and mammalian insulins. Eli
Lilly and Genentech were therefore free to
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market recombinant human insulin without liability to the University of California.
Later cases used the invigorated written description requirement to invalidate
broad university patent claims to methods
of treatment based on discoveries of metabolic pathways likely to be useful in developing new drugs. In University of Rochester v.
G. D. Searle, the Federal Circuit invalidated
claims that would have allowed the University of Rochester to demand royalties from
pharmaceutical firms that had developed
any selective Cox-2 inhibitors.26 Cox-2 inhibitors are anti-inflammatory drugs with
fewer gastrointestinal side effects than aspirin.27 The Federal Circuit invalidated the
university’s patent on a “method for selectively inhibiting pghs-2 activity in a human host” for lack of an adequate written
description. The inventors developed an
assay to identify Cox-2 inhibitors, but did
not identify or describe any specific inhibitors. The court explicitly rejected the argument that this holding “will have a significant impact on the continuing viability of
technology transfer programs at universities and on the equitable allocation of intellectual property rights between universities
and the private sector,” noting that “none
of the . . . policy objectives of the Bayh-Dole
Act encourages or condones less stringent
application of the patent laws to universities than to other entities.”28
The Federal Circuit was even more emphatic in its en banc decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly.29 Researchers at Harvard
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (mit) described the nf𝜘b pathway that explained the mechanisms of action of several blockbuster drugs. As in the
Rochester case, the university researchers
had not actually found an inhibitory compound, but their patents broadly claimed
methods of regulating nf𝜘b activity. The
Harvard/mit patents were licensed exclusively to Ariad Pharmaceuticals, which
sued Eli Lilly, developer of the nf𝜘b inhib147 (4) Fall 2018

itors Evista and Xigris. The Federal Circuit
seemed to view the university patents as anticipatory poaching of the work of the pharmaceutical industry rather than as essential
enablers of commercialization:
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Such claims merely recite a description of the
problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it . . . leaving it to the pharmaceutical
industry to complete an unfinished invention.
Ariad complains that the doctrine disadvantages universities to the extent that basic research cannot be patented. But the patent
law has always been directed to the “useful
Arts,” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 8, meaning inventions with a practical use . . . and universities may not have the resources or inclination to work out the practical implications of
all such research, i.e., finding and identifying
compounds able to affect the mechanism discovered. That is no failure of the law’s interpretation, but its intention. . . . [The law] limits
patent protection to those who actually perform the difficult work of “invention”–that
is, conceive of the complete and final invention with all its claimed limitations–and disclose the fruits of that effort to the public.30

The Federal Circuit rejected arguments
that the “written description” doctrine
that it had used to invalidate this and other broad university patents on early-stage
discoveries removed incentives for private investment in the commercialization
of university inventions. Perhaps these arguments seemed particularly unpersuasive
in a lawsuit against a firm that had developed and brought to market two commercial products without the benefit of any protection provided by the university patents.
The practical significance of this line of
cases has been partially eclipsed by more
recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme
Court limiting patentable subject matter.
These decisions, which preclude patents
on natural products, laws of nature, and
phenomena of nature, provide an alternative basis for invalidating university pat81

Universities:
The Fallen
Angels of
Bayh-Dole?

ents arising from fundamental discoveries
about biochemical pathways.31 Universities participated in amicus briefs that unsuccessfully argued against the approach
ultimately taken by the Court. The Supreme Court holdings extend beyond the
problem of reach-through patents from
universities–the cases that gave rise to
the robust written description requirement from the Federal Circuit–and call
into question the validity of many commercial patents in the life sciences.32
Yet both the Federal Circuit’s written
description requirement and the Supreme
Court’s patentable subject matter doctrine
reflect similar concerns: that broad patents
on early research discoveries might hinder science and impede rather than promote applications of those discoveries. Although both written description and patentable subject matter doctrines apply to
all patents, they present more of an obstacle to patenting early stage research discoveries from university laboratories than to
patenting commercial products. Universities argued that these consequences contravened the purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act,
but to no avail. These decisions thus represent significant losses for universities and
provide a countervailing narrative to the
story that university patents are necessary
for commercial development.

In addition to seeking patents that are not
necessary to promote commercialization,
universities have put revenue goals ahead
of commercialization by enforcing their
patents in litigation against firms that have
already developed successful commercial
products without the benefit of university patents.33
A recent example that reached the U.S.
Supreme Court is Stanford University v. Roche
Molecular Systems.34 The patents at issue
arose from nih-funded research performed
by Mark Holodniy, a Stanford postdoctoral
fellow. Stanford researchers were collabo82

rating with scientists at the private firm Cetus to develop an hiv assay using the polymerase chain reaction (pcr). pcr is an important technology developed at Cetus that
later won its inventor, Kary Mullis, a Nobel
Prize. Stanford sent Holodniy to Cetus to
learn pcr and to work on an hiv assay. Holodniy then returned to Stanford and tested
the assay in the clinic with other Stanford
inventors before Stanford filed patent applications. Meanwhile, Roche acquired Cetus’s pcr patent rights and began manufacturing pcr-based hiv detection kits. After
the patents were issued to Stanford, Stanford sought royalties from Roche. When
they failed to reach agreement, Stanford
sued Roche for patent infringement. On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that Roche,
rather than Stanford, was the true owner
of Holodniy’s interest in the patents based
upon its technical analysis of the legal effects of the terms of two different agreements: a “Visitor Confidentiality Agreement” that Holodniy signed at Cetus and
a “Copyright and Patent Agreement” that
he had previously signed at Stanford.35 The
Supreme Court granted review to consider
whether the Bayh-Dole Act required a different result.36
Stanford made a compelling argument
that allocation of ownership to Cetus/
Roche contravened the design of the BayhDole Act to give universities (and other contractors) the first option to claim rights in
inventions made in federally sponsored research. As Justice Breyer explained in a dissenting opinion, contractor ownership is
necessary to ensure compliance with a set
of conditions that the Bayh-Dole Act requires be included in research funding
agreements to protect the public interest.37 These include provisions for retention of government licenses, reporting
obligations, and restrictions on permissible assignments. These safeguards are lost
when inventions are assigned–even inadvertently, as apparently happened in this
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case–to third parties not bound by those
agreements. Moreover, the Bayh-Dole Act
contemplates a clear hierarchy of claims
to patent ownership with the contractor
first in line, followed by the sponsor, and
with inventors allowed to claim ownership only when neither the contractor nor
the sponsor objects.38 Justice Roberts’s majority opinion inverts this order by holding
that the Bayh-Dole Act applies only to inventions owned by the contractor, and not
to inventions that employees fail to assign
properly to contractors. Although the majority opinion purports to apply strict textual analysis to the language of the Bayh-Dole
Act, it ignores many textual cues about the
design of the statute that support a different interpretation.
On the other hand, it is hard to argue that
Stanford’s assertion of patent rights promoted commercialization. Roche developed the technology commercially years
before Stanford’s patents issued. Roche
clearly did not rely on Stanford’s patents.
The patents did not help Roche, but rather gave Stanford an opportunity to claim a
share of the proceeds.
Hard cases make bad law. To the extent that Stanford v. Roche calls into question whether universities hold secure title
to the patents they are trying to license, it
jeopardizes the commercialization goals
of the Bayh-Dole Act as well as the protections for the public interest that the BayhDole Act addresses in the terms of funding agreements. Stanford’s overreaching
in this particular case, where university
patents were unnecessary for commercialization, may threaten future rights where
clear university title is essential for further
development.
In 2008, intellectual property law scholar
Mark Lemley posed the provocative question, “are universities patent trolls?”39 The
idea that universities can be patent trolls
(that is, patent assertion entities that do
not themselves commercialize technolo147 (4) Fall 2018

gy but profit by asserting patents against
commercial firms) soon became more
commonplace, as major research universities used their patents to collect hundreds
of millions of dollars in damage awards and
settlements.40 Criticized for behaving like
patent trolls, universities have sometimes
sought to avoid the reputational costs of litigation by selling their rights to undisputed
patent trolls.41
Like patent assertion entities, universities
can enforce their patents with little fear of
provoking counterclaims for infringement
of the patents held by the defendants. Patent infringement litigation against universities and academic researchers is quite
rare. This allows university scientists to infringe patents in their laboratories with relative impunity even as universities enforce
their patents against other institutions.42
But this is largely the result of forbearance
by patent owners rather than legal immunity from suit.
Universities lost a claim to special status
as infringement defendants in the case of
Madey v. Duke University.43 Physicist John
Madey sued Duke for using his patented field electron laser in a university laboratory. Rejecting Duke’s argument that
the noncommercial character of academic work precludes infringement liability,
the Federal Circuit held that the university would be liable for any use that was in
keeping with the “legitimate business” of
the university:
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For example, major research universities,
such as Duke, often sanction and fund research projects with arguably no commercial application whatsoever. However, these
projects unmistakably further the institution’s legitimate business objectives, including educating and enlightening students and
faculty participating in these projects. These
projects also serve, for example, to increase
the status of the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students, and faculty.44
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In a footnote, the court added that “Duke
. . . like other major research institutions of
higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an
aggressive patent licensing program from
which it derives a not insubstantial revenue stream.”45 In other words, to the Federal Circuit, universities are not angels entitled to a privileged status in the patent system, but rather a particular kind of worldly
institution pursuing its own objectives, including money.
Other academics may have more to gain
than commercial firms from suing academic institutions for patent infringement. Indeed, Madey v. Duke was a lawsuit brought
by a faculty member against his former
university. In another currently pending
case, the University of South Florida has
sued both the nih and the nonprofit Jackson Laboratories for making and distributing transgenic mice that are used in Alzheimer’s disease research.46 The cases may or
may not succeed, but the fact that a university would bring these lawsuits suggests a
decline of academic sharing norms as universities seek to profit from their patents.

Universities have also sought to expand

their patent rights by lobbying Congress to
change the patent laws in their favor, with
mixed results.
This strategy backfired in a campaign by
Columbia University to extend the term of
its lucrative Axel patents. Columbia worked
through Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire, a Columbia alumnus, who introduced
three different bills in an attempt to extend
Columbia’s patent term.47 The patents were
then under license to multiple commercial
firms, none of which stood to benefit by
prolonging their royalty obligations to Columbia. When Senator Gregg’s backroom
legislative maneuvers became public, there
was a strong backlash against both him and
Columbia from drug manufacturers, consumer groups, and other members of Congress. Senator Gregg responded that Co84

lumbia was “a poor little university” contending with “a fair amount of greed on the
part of the drug companies.”48 This phrase
came back to haunt Columbia when some
of its licensees sued to invalidate one of Columbia’s patents. During a hearing in that
case, the District Court judge, observing
eight lawyers for Columbia in his courtroom, quipped “I thought Columbia was a
nonprofit organization who couldn’t afford
this litigation.”49 In 2004, Columbia signed
covenants not to sue the companies for infringement of the disputed patent, and later that year further agreed not to sue anyone else and backed away from demanding
royalties.50
Other university lobbying efforts have
been more successful, leading to statutory changes that make it easier for universities to obtain and enforce patents.51 Some
of these moves have been broadly congruent with the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act. The
create Act of 2004, for example, facilitates
university-industry research collaborations
by extending the benefit of a statutory safe
harbor that, as originally enacted, prevented the use of nonpublic information as patent-defeating prior art against patent applications filed by other employees within the
same firm.52 As amended by the create
Act, the safe harbor also applies to information belonging to another party to a joint
research agreement.53 This is consistent
with the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act.
The recitals in the Bayh-Dole Act reflect a
clear intent “to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
organizations, including universities,” and
the statutory change facilitates such interactions by allowing free communication in
the course of such collaborations without
fear of losing patent rights.54
Universities had a significant impact on
the new first-to-file rules in the America
Invents Act of 2011 (aia). That legislation
changed U.S. law to conform to patent laws
of other countries by shifting from the in-
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vention date to the application filing date
as the time for determining whether an
invention is patentable in light of the prior art. Universities initially opposed this
change. They worried that the first-to-file
priority rule might force them to incur substantial patent filing costs to preserve priority, and that scientists would be unwilling to defer publication until after patent
filing.55 In the end, universities persuaded
Congress to modify the new rule to retain
a modified version of a one-year “grace period” from prior U.S. law.56 The grace period gives inventors a year after public disclosure before they lose the right to file patent
applications.
Although the grace period is formally
available to all inventors, it is most likely to
benefit universities. Commercial firms that
plan to seek patent rights in other countries
are unlikely to rely on it, because public disclosures in the United States would defeat
their patent rights elsewhere. But to the
extent that it facilitates early publication
of research results, the grace period may
encourage prompt dissemination of new
knowledge.
It is harder to identify a public policy
argument, however, for changes that universities secured to a “prior user” infringement defense in the aia. Like the modified grace period, this provision grew out
of university resistance to a proposed
change in the law. In 1999, following unexpected decisions of the Federal Circuit
upholding patents on methods of doing
business, Congress enacted a new “prior
user” infringement defense, initially available only against business method patents.57 This defense protected a user who,
acting in good faith, completed the invention at least one year before the patent filing date and commercially used it before
the filing date.
The aia expanded the prior user defense
in several ways. It broadened it to cover all
patents, not just patents on business meth147 (4) Fall 2018

ods.58 It extended the defense to certain related parties and assignees of the original
prior user. And although it retained the language about “commercial use,” in a bow to
universities, it added a new provision defining commercial use to include “use by
a nonprofit laboratory or other nonprofit
entity such as a university or hospital, for
which the public is the intended beneficiary.” So far so good: expanding the prior user
defense to include universities was entirely consistent with the goals of Bayh-Dole.
More troubling, however, was a change
that effectively eliminated prior user rights
as a defense to infringement of university
patents. In response to university lobbying,
Congress added the so-called university exception. Under that exception, a defendant
may not invoke the prior user defense if the
invention “was, at the time the invention
was made, owned or subject to an obligation of assignment to . . . an institution of
higher education.”59 In other words, when
universities are sued as infringement defendants, they can invoke prior user rights to
avoid liability, but when universities assert their patents against others, prior user
rights are unavailable to defendants. This
turns the commercialization justification
for the Bayh-Dole Act upside down. Rather than using their patents to help commercial firms develop early stage academic inventions into useful products, universities
(and only universities) may now use their
patents to sue firms that are so far ahead of
academic scientists that they had already
put the invention to commercial use a full
year before the university filed a patent application. Moreover, since the “university
exception” turns not on current ownership,
but on whether there was an obligation to
assign at the time the invention was made,
the defense remains unavailable even if the
university later sells the patent to a patent
assertion entity (that is, a patent troll).
The statutory text shows vestigial remnants of a university halo. The expansion
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of the prior user defense to university laboratories includes the qualification that the
use be one “for which the public is the intended beneficiary.”60 But universities tarnished their halos by persuading Congress
to eliminate prior user rights as a defense
against university patents.
These successes in getting Congress to
give universities special treatment under
patent law show that the university technology transfer community has become a
force to be reckoned with in patent policy.
But they also show universities using their
lobbying muscle in unabashed pursuit of
their own financial interests rather than
broader public interests in the dissemination and utilization of new knowledge.

The Bayh-Dole Act chose universities and

small businesses as the first beneficiaries of
a broader policy shift that aimed to facilitate the commercialization of inventions
made in the course of government-sponsored research. It allocated ownership of
patent rights to contractors rather than to
government funding agencies. Universities, as traditional champions of free dissemination of new knowledge, were regarded as trustworthy stewards of patent
rights for the public benefit, in contrast to
the big business contractors who later benefited from the same policy. The focus on universities and small businesses made it easier to pass the legislation. Nonetheless, the

clear goal of the Bayh-Dole Act was not to
generate revenues for universities on government-sponsored research, but rather to
facilitate commercial development of new
technologies that needed patent incentives
to induce postdiscovery private investment.
In the years since passage of the BayhDole Act, universities seem to have lost
sight of this distinction. Their behavior as
patent seekers, patent enforcers, and patent policy stakeholders often seems to work
against the commercialization goals of the
Bayh-Dole Act and is difficult to explain or
justify on any basis other than the pursuit
of revenue.
Universities do good work, and more revenue allows them to do more of it. But revenues from university-owned patents remain a small source of revenue for universities overall, and in total account for less
than 5 percent of universities’ research expenditures. The policy question is: when
do the benefits of university patents justify the costs? Meanwhile, technology transfer offices, as opposed to faculty, have come
to dominate the voice of universities in debates about patent policy. The result is a tailwagging-the-dog distortion, in which the
interests of universities as patent owners
may be overwhelming their broader interests in widespread dissemination and utilization of new knowledge for the public
benefit.
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